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ABSTRACT 
 
 This Prosecuting those accused of domestic violence presents an array 
of challenges for prosecutors. These crimes are frequently a he-said, she-
said situation with minimal physical evidence. This puts a heavy weight on 
victim testimony in order to obtain a conviction. Unfortunately, many 
victims refuse to testify at the outset, agree to testify then change their 
minds, or do not show up for the court date. Without that testimony, 
prosecutors will often drop the charges against an accused, possibly putting 
the victim at risk of another episode of violence.  
 Justice Scalia opened the door to the possibility of a prosecutor being 
able to use out-of-court statements made by the victim, without the victim’s 
testimony at trial. Such statements would typically be inadmissible hearsay, 
but in Giles v. California Justice Scalia stated that past episodes of 
domestic abuse could create a situation where a defendant has forfeited his 
right to confront the witness at trial. If a prosecutor can establish that the 
abuser has, by the very nature of the abuse, intended to keep the victim 
from cooperating with the investigation or prosecution, a forfeiture 
argument is possible. If granted, any and all relevant statements the abuser 
made to the victim could be used against him without requiring the victim to 
testify. The results would be more convictions and, more importantly, 
removing the victim from a dangerous situation.   
 
 INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution grants a criminal defendant the right to 
confront witnesses against him at trial.1 However, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized an exception to this right when a defendant causes 
the witness to be absent from court. In Giles v. California, Justice Antonin 
Scalia states that courts must find the criminal defendant intended to pre-
vent a witness from testifying in order to make a finding of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.2 Dicta from Giles, and a concurring opinion authored by Jus-
tice David Souter, state that past crimes of domestic violence are highly rel-
evant in analyzing a forfeiture argument.3 By their nature, such crimes are 
often intended to isolate the victim and prevent her from seeking outside 
                                               
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”). 
2 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 361 (2008) (emphasis added). 
3 See Giles, 554 U.S. at 379–80. 
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help.4 The emotional and psychological impact of domestic violence illus-
trates that by engaging in domestic violence the abuser has sufficient con-
trol over the victim to prevent her from testifying as a witness.5 This com-
ment argues that by engaging in domestic violence, a criminal defendant 
possesses the inferred intent to prevent the victim from testifying, thus trig-
gering forfeiture by wrongdoing. Further, for prosecuting these crimes, a 
finding of forfeiture would allow the admission of various statements made 
by victims that might otherwise be inadmissible hearsay. A victim’s state-
ments of past abuse would serve as crucial evidence for an evidence-based 
prosecution if the victim is unavailable as a witness at the trial.6  
Part I of this paper outlines the holding in Giles v. California and analyz-
es the inferred intent dicta from Giles, as well as Justice Souter’s concur-
ring opinion. Part II discusses the emotional and psychological effects of 
domestic violence to support the notion that an abuser exerts sufficient con-
trol over a victim to impact her will to seek outside help, and thus, trigger-
ing forfeiture. Part III includes examples of how courts have interpreted the 
dicta from Giles. Finally, this comment concludes by restating my argument 
that an abuser forfeits his confrontation right by engaging in domestic vio-
lence and causing its subsequent impact on victim-witnesses. 
I. THE GILES HOLDING AND DICTA 
 A. The Giles Decision 
The defendant in Giles was convicted of first-degree murder of his for-
mer girlfriend, Brenda Avie.7 At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce 
statements that Avie made to a police officer responding to a domestic vio-
lence call three weeks prior to her murder.8 She told the responding officer 
that Giles had picked her up and choked her.9 She further explained to the 
officer that when Giles released her, he punched her and threatened her with 
                                               
4 Id. at 380. I recognize that victims of domestic violence can be both male and female, but this paper 
uses “she” for the victim and “he” for the abuser because the overwhelming majority of victims are 
women. 
5 See infra Part II. 
6 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
7 Giles, 554 U.S. at 356–57. 
8 Id. at 356. 
9 Id. at 356–57. 
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a knife.10 The statements were admitted at trial over defense counsel’s ob-
jections.11  
The trial court admitted the statements because they related to the “inflic-
tion or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is una-
vailable to testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustwor-
thy.”12 The California Court of Appeals and California Supreme Court 
affirmed.13 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right under the Confrontation Clause is for-
feited when the witness cannot appear at trial due to the actions of the de-
fendant.14 
The Supreme Court reiterated two exceptions to the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause: statements made near death,15 and statements made 
by a witness who was detained or made unavailable by the defendant.16 The 
Court held that Avie’s statements did not fall into the dying declaration cat-
egory because they were made three weeks before her murder.17 The Court 
then focused its analysis on the witness’s absence resulting from the de-
fendant’s wrongdoing. The majority opinion discusses prior cases and trea-
tises finding forfeiture in conduct designed to prevent the witness from tes-
tifying, the defendant’s means and contrivances kept the witness away, or 
the defendant's scheme to prevent the witness from testifying.18 The Court 
simplifies this as the prosecution must prove beyond a preponderance of the 
evidence “that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying” 
in order for forfeiture to apply.19  
The Court held the victim's statements inadmissible because the state did 
not prove the defendant engaged in wrongdoing (namely, choking and 
punching the victim) for the purpose of procuring the victim’s silence; that 
is, the design, purpose, or scheme was lacking.20 
                                               
10 Id. at 357. 
11 Id. 
12 Giles, 554 U.S. at 357; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–68 (1980) (referring to the “indicia 
of reliability” and illustrating the difficult nature of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence (citing Mancusi 
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)))). 
13 Giles, 554 U.S. at 357. 
14 See id. at 357–58. 
15 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); Giles, 554 U.S. at 357–58; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 
(1892). 
16 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Giles, 554 U.S. at 359; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
17 Giles, 554 U.S. at 359–60. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 361 (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at 377. 
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However, in dicta, the Court discusses forfeiture in the domestic violence 
context.21 Justice Scalia opens the door to the idea that intent to prevent a 
victim from testifying can be found in domestic violence by the nature of 
the crime itself.22 Combined with Justice Souter’s concurring opinion 
(joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg), the dicta provide an opening, if 
ever so slight, for the argument that by engaging in acts of domestic vio-
lence a defendant pressures the victim not to cooperate with the justice sys-
tem.23 This could amount to a finding of forfeiture based on “highly rele-
vant” evidence of past abuse, which is discussed below.24 
 B. Inferred Intent to Prevent Confrontation 
Justice Scalia speaks of “inferred intent” in the context of domestic vio-
lence that culminates in murder.25 He writes, “Acts of domestic violence of-
ten are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and in-
clude conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or 
cooperation in criminal prosecutions.”26 Although Justice Souter’s concur-
rence notes that homicide is an “extreme example,”27 taken together, the 
dicta and the concurring opinion establish a framework for identifying in-
tent to prevent victim cooperation when analyzing the abusive relationship 
in a broader context. “Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dis-
suade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to 
this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which 
the victim would have been expected to testify.”28 Here, Justice Scalia is 
careful to consider “evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings” separately 
from evidence of “earlier abuse.”29 By separating them in his opinion, Jus-
tice Scalia considers evidence of past abuse or threats to suffice as “highly 
relevant” to the inquiry, even without evidence of an ongoing criminal pro-
ceeding. Thus, absent a pending hearing, a defendant may still forfeit his 
confrontation right. Deborah Tuerkheimer describes this as “pre-arrest” ev-
idence of domestic violence.30  
                                               
21 Id. 
22 Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 377 (emphasis added). 
27 Giles, 554 U.S. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring). 
28 Id. at 377 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
30 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The Relevance of “Domestic Violence Context,” 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 711, 723–24 (2009). 
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Justice Souter also finds intent is necessary and states that past abuse is a 
road map to the culminating crime.31 In Giles, the culminating crime was 
murder. Justice Souter writes, “If evidence for admissibility shows a con-
tinuing relationship of this sort (abusive, isolating, and controlling), it 
would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously 
abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed . . . .”32 Justice 
Souter also notes that there is nothing from early case law or other material 
that suggests “any reason to doubt that the element of intention would nor-
mally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser 
in the classic abusive relationship . . . .”33 Justice Souter defines the “classic 
abusive relationship” as one “meant to isolate the victim from outside help, 
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.”34  
Justices Scalia and Souter agree that domestic violence crimes constitute 
a complex issue for the court when identifying a criminal defendant’s intent 
to silence. They also agree that intent is the primary component of a forfei-
ture analysis, and evidence of past abuse is “highly relevant.”35 Despite this 
opinion being in the context of domestic violence culminating in murder, 
the test for inferring intent is applicable to non-homicide domestic violence 
as well. “Ironically, Giles may make it easier for prosecutors to prove for-
feiture when an unavailable victim is alive than when she has been killed by 
the defendant . . . because in many or even most of these cases, specific ev-
idence connects the defendant’s misconduct to the victim’s decision not to 
cooperate.”36 Control, isolation, coercion, physical violence, threats of vio-
lence, or any combination of these acts can be present in an abusive rela-
tionship, regardless of whether it culminates in homicide. The elements of 
abusive relationships have profound impacts on the victim’s psyche, which 
would be “highly relevant” when a court is pressed to make a finding of 
forfeiture. These elements and their effects are discussed in the next section. 
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON VICTIMS 
Violence, threats, and coercion are employed by abusers to control and 
isolate victims.37 Through acts of violence, an abuser's threats become in-
creasingly credible and diminish a victim’s ability to act with complete au-
                                               
31 See Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring).  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 377 (majority opinion), 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring). 
36 Tuerkheimer, supra note 30, at 722. 
37 See MO. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE AND 
DYNAMICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (2012), https://www.mocadsv.org/FileStream.aspx?FileID=2. 
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tonomy.38 This section explores how knowing the psychological effects of 
domestic violence gives prosecutors a better understanding of domestic vio-
lence, and an enhanced ability to argue forfeiture to a judge. 
Abusers use violence and threats of violence as a means to control the 
victim. Courts have defined violence as behaviors ranging from threats of 
violence to physical assaults to murder.39 Psychologist Lenore Walker 
found that repeated incidents of abuse take control away from the victim.40 
“Research shows that, more than any other class of violent criminals, do-
mestic abusers are fueled by a crusade to control their intimate partners—a 
concept known as the ‘control motive.’”41 As a victim loses control, the 
abuser can coerce and manipulate outcomes. “The batterer’s desire to dom-
inate his victim functions as the animating force behind his abusive behav-
ior.”42 
Recent literature expanded the scope of domestic violence research to the 
broader category of intimate partner violence to include non-married cou-
ples and relationship violence, as well as traditional marriages. Findings 
still demonstrate the diminished control felt by victims is a recurring 
theme.43 The expansion to intimate partner violence reflects the understand-
ing that intimate relationships are dynamic between partners and is a more 
accurate reflection of how society views intimate partners and intimate 
partner violence.44 However, since the introduction of Walker’s theory in 
1979, the phenomenon of an abuser's control over his victim still remains. 
“Complying (with an abuser’s demands) doesn’t necessarily mean that one 
‘wants’ to do what the partner demands; more likely the individual is trying 
to create safety for oneself and one’s children.”45 In fact, “The day-to-day 
‘rules’ imposed by an abusive partner may be those that one becomes ac-
customed to as a personal risk management strategy—even without recog-
                                               
38 See id. at 4. 
39 See State v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231, 234 (Or. 2014) (defendant physically and emotionally abused 
his wife); State v. Baldwin, 794 N.W.2d 769, 771–72 (Wis. 2010) (defendant threatened to “kill her” 
and “blacken [her] eye”); People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 480–81 (2009) (defendant assaulted 
his ex-girlfriend, and ultimately murdered her). 
40 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 44–54 (1979) (theorizing that victims of domestic 
abuse suffer from learned helplessness, becoming passive once they realize their actions will not change 
or stop the abuse). 
41 Brief for Minouche Kandel et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 22–23, People v. Bel-
tran, 56 Cal. 4th 935 (No. S192644) (2013). 
42 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize 
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 965 (2004). 
43 See Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New 
Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743–44 (2005). 
44 Tuerkheimer, supra note 42, at 1018–19. 
45 Dutton & Goodman, supra note 43, at 752. 
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nizing the extent of compliance.”46 
An abuser lays the foundation for coercion and control by communi-
cating threats backed by corresponding physical violence, if the victim does 
not act a certain way.47 Physical violence is not essential for coercion and 
control, but it does reinforce the credibility of threats made against the vic-
tim.48 When the threats become credible through acts of violence, the abuser 
gains control at the expense of the victim’s control. Maintaining control is a 
form of coercion, and “coercion can only be maintained if the threat is cred-
ible.”49  
Physical abuse is only one aspect of domestic violence. An abuser can 
use economic abuse, threats, or other forms of violence, to coerce and con-
trol the victim.50 Further, Evan Stark argues that acts of domestic violence 
are not individual instances in a cycle, but are “part of a larger pattern of 
ongoing coercion and control.”51 Stark defines coercion as “the use of force 
or threats to compel or dispel a particular response,” and control as “struc-
tural forms of deprivation, exploitation, and command that compel obedi-
ence indirectly by monopolizing vital resources, dictating preferred choices 
. . . limiting her options, and depriving her of supports needed to exercise 
independent judgment.”52 
Mary Ann Dutton and Lisa Goodman define coercion as “a dynamic pro-
cess linking a demand with a credible, threatened negative consequence for 
noncompliance.”53 When credible threats of violence exist, an abuser can 
use various forms of coercion including increased violence, threats, intimi-
dation, and economic pressure, to name a few. “The cumulative harm of 
this multifaceted abuse can result in the victim exhibiting low self-esteem, 
guilt, shame, anger, sadness, unrealistic hope, denial, self-blame, and, espe-
cially, fear.”54 The psychological toll faced by victims of domestic violence 
translates into a loss of autonomy and control, and the abuser uses his pow-
er to coerce outcomes that are desirable to him.55 One such outcome is pre-
venting a victim from testifying against an abuser.  
                                               
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 752–53. 
48 See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 376 (2007). 
49 LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 37 
(2012). 
50 See Sarah M. Buel, Putting Forfeiture to Work, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1379 (2010).  
51 GOODMARK, supra note 39, at 35 (referring to STARK, supra note 48).  
52 STARK, supra note 48, at 228–29. 
53 Dutton & Goodman, supra note 43, at 746–47. 
54 Buel, supra note 50, at 1341. 
55 See id. at 1342. 
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Coercion and control can easily be seen when there is a pending legal 
proceeding but also present absent a legal proceeding.56 When abuse occurs 
after a legal proceeding has commenced, specific intent to keep the victim 
from testifying is readily observable. Deborah Tuerkheimer refers to the 
timing of this violence as “post-incident conduct.”57 She writes, “The de-
fendant’s acts are designed to persuade the victim—by threats or emotional 
appeals—to change her story, drop charges, absent herself, or otherwise be-
come unavailable as a prosecution witness.”58 An abuser’s knowledge of the 
justice system can also be weaponized against his victim, because he views 
it as a challenge to his power. “It is not surprising, then, that batterers feel 
outraged when their crimes are reported to authorities, for then their victims 
are challenging their absolute power.”59 Sarah Buel found: 
Since the Crawford-Davis-Giles rulings, a great number of victims have re-
vealed that their batterers actually explain to them that if they do not appear in 
court, the case must be dismissed. Armed with the knowledge that many courts 
have opted for dismissal rather than navigating the confusing forfeiture process, 
offenders are hypermotivated to silence their victims. . . . Most victims thus 
view the batterer as victor, for he has successfully manipulated the criminal jus-
tice system to ensure she cannot utilize it to achieve safety.60  
Being incarcerated does not mean that abuse stops. Indeed, abusers uti-
lize jail phone calls to pressure victims to refrain from cooperating with law 
enforcement and prosecutors.61  
In what Tuerkheimer labels “pre-arrest” violence, there exists a method 
of inferring intent to silence a victim, absent a legal proceeding. “For in-
stance, assume that in the course of their relationship, but prior to his arrest 
on current charges, the defendant (as is typical) explicitly threatens to harm 
the victim if she ever helps put him in jail.”62 Despite a lack of pending le-
gal proceedings, “. . . it would be bizarre to contend that his conduct is any 
less wrongful simply because it did not occur in anticipation of his arrest in 
the instant case. And indeed, the Court’s decision in Giles would seem to 
allow for a forfeiture finding under these circumstances.”63 “In this relative-
ly large category of cases [when a live victim has been made unavailable 
for trial], where the primary motivating force is a battered woman’s fear of 
                                               
56 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 30, at 722–24. 
57 Id. at 722. 
58 Id. 
59 Buel, supra note 50, at 1340. 
60 See id. at 1331. 
61 People v. Nixon, 53 N.E.3d 301, 305 (Ill. 2016) (explaining that the defendant called friends asking 
them to pressure witnesses to not testify). 
62 Tuerkheimer, supra note 30, at 723. 
63 Id. at 724. 
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future injury, the causation requirement should be readily satisfied.”64 The 
majority opinion in Giles left this avenue open by holding that evidence of 
earlier abuse and threats is “highly relevant” to a forfeiture proceeding.65 
The standard, whether pre- or post-arrest, remains an intent based standard 
to be proven beyond a preponderance of the evidence.66 Thus, pending legal 
proceedings are relevant to the analysis, but not dispositive.  
Abusers have an entire toolbox of coercive tools at their disposal once 
their threats of violence become credible. Intimidation, threats of violence, 
phone calls from jail, and weaponized knowledge of the judicial system all 
tip the scales of control in favor of the abuser. Armed with these tools of 
coercion and control, an abuser can silence or distance his victim from 
those who would help her attain justice and safety. Whether pre-arrest or 
post-arrest, a court can hear evidence on the abuser’s violence and coercive 
measures to find that he acted with the requisite intent to keep the victim 
from court, because the leading case on forfeiture, Giles, held that the cor-
nerstone of forfeiture is intent.67 Intent can be found in an abuser’s direct 
actions and statements, in his conduct throughout an abusive relationship, 
and in his conduct in the build-up to a legal proceeding. When a court has 
the opportunity to analyze the totality of abuse as the causation for a vic-
tim’s absence, it can infer the defendant's intent to keep the victim from tes-
tifying against him. 
III. APPLYING THE GILES DICTA AND CONCURRENCE 
As explained above, the guidance from Giles instructed courts to focus 
on a defendant’s intent to procure a victim-witness’s absence from court.68 
In the domestic violence context, this includes intent inferred from past in-
stances of abuse.69 Inferred intent can be present in both homicide and non-
homicide cases of domestic violence.70 This section reviews cases that ap-
ply the inferred intent principle to show forfeiture of the Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation. 
In State v. Supanchick, the defendant was found to have forfeited his 
confrontation right.71 The defendant in this case physically and emotionally 
                                               
64 Id. at 725. 
65 Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
70 Tuerkheimer, supra note 30, at 722. 
71 See Supanchick, 323 P.3d at 233–34. 
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abused his wife, resulting in a restraining order against him.72 The wife filed 
for divorce soon after obtaining the restraining order.73 Three weeks after 
his wife filed for divorce, defendant filed for divorce and “devised a plan to 
persuade his wife to recant the allegations against him, give him custody of 
their daughter, and leave the state.”74 The defendant’s plan included enter-
ing his wife’s house carrying a loaded shotgun and restraining her with duct 
tape.75 The defendant knew he needed to work fast to prevent her from call-
ing 911 and reporting his presence, because he was, among other things, vi-
olating the restraining order.76 
The police were dispatched to the house after the defendant’s mother was 
unable to reach him.77 After his unsuccessful attempt to persuade his wife to 
recant, and with the police knocking at the door, the defendant shot and 
killed his wife.78 The evidentiary issue for the trial court was the admissibil-
ity of the wife’s statements made when obtaining the restraining order.79 
The court initially ruled that the statements, taken as a whole, were too gen-
eral for admissibility, but allowed the prosecutor to identify specific state-
ments relating to prior abuse.80 These statements included “that defendant 
had told his wife to ‘buy a wooden spoon so that he could beat [her] with 
it,’ that ‘he’d already dug the hole for [her] for when he got rid of [her],’ 
and ‘that he had threatened to ‘slit [her] throat bilaterally.’”81 The state-
ments were admitted and defendant was found guilty.82 
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding the trial 
court properly admitted the wife’s past statements regarding abuse.83 The 
defendant argued on appeal that forfeiture only applied if the defendant’s 
“primary purpose” was preventing a witness from testifying.84 But the court 
found that the text of the rule did not create such a requirement, and as 
such, only one motivating factor needed to be procuring the witness’ ab-
sence.85 Citing Giles, the court stated, “Acts of domestic violence that cul-
                                               
72 Id. at 234. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Supanchick, 323 P.3d at 234. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 234–35. 
79 Id. at 235. 
80 Id. at 235–36. 
81 Supanchick, 232 P.3d at 236. 
82 Id. at 233–34. 
83 Id. at 234. 
84 Id. at 236. 
85 Id. at 236–38. The applicable rules of evidence in this case were the Oregon Evidence Code, specifi-
cally OR. R. EVID. 804(3)(g). 
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minate in murder can reflect a complex of motives; limiting forfeiture by 
wrongdoing to those instances in which the defendant’s primary motive or 
purpose was to make the declarant unavailable would undercut the majori-
ty’s explanation [in Giles] of the ways in which the forfeiture doctrine will 
apply in domestic violence cases.”86  
Supanchick demonstrates the court’s ability to view an abusive relation-
ship in context for forfeiture proceedings. Statements that imply an intent to 
silence a victim are illustrative to establish a defendant’s purpose. The court 
found evidence of past abuse to be “highly relevant” to the forfeiture pro-
ceeding in compliance with Giles.87 Where evidence of intent exists in an 
abusive relationship, a court should analyze the evidence in the context of 
the relationship and a finding of forfeiture is possible. It may be unreasona-
ble to draw a bright-line distinction on how far in the past a court must go, 
but Giles does not call for that determination. Where a defendant’s purpose 
or intent can be demonstrated to include preventing his victim from testify-
ing, a court may find forfeiture.  
The Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. 
John in Virgin Islands v. Toussaint also found a defendant had forfeited his 
confrontation rights when his former girlfriend, Tinashei Phillips, had fled 
to the United States to avoid him.88 To determine forfeiture, the court held a 
separate hearing.89 At issue were statements made by Phillips to Corporal 
Leroy Francis, a police officer, detailing instances of past domestic vio-
lence, including an incident on September 10, 2010.90 Additional statements 
by Phillips to the officer included threats made by defendant via text mes-
sage to Phillips, her son, and her family.91 
The court reaffirmed that the standard of proof is beyond a preponder-
ance of the evidence.92 It established the victim had left the Virgin Islands 
and discarded her cell phone, rendering her unreachable and unavailable.93 
In its forfeiture analysis, the court found that defendant was on notice of 
Phillips’ willingness to work with police following the September 10, 2010, 
domestic violence incident.94 From that incident until trial, evidence of the 
defendant’s conduct established his intent to prevent her cooperation.95 The 
                                               
86 Supanchick, 232 P.3d at 239. 
87 Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
88 Virgin Islands v. Toussaint, 55 V.I. 419, 421 (2011). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 421–22. 
92 Id. at 423–24. 
93 Toussaint, 55 V.I. at 424. 
94 Id. at 425. 
95 Id. at 426. 
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court was “mindful of the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in Giles v. Cali-
fornia that ‘[a]cts of domestic violence are often intended to dissuade the 
victim from resorting to outside help . . . to prevent testimony to police of-
ficers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions.’”96 Again, earlier abuse is 
“highly relevant” to the forfeiture inquiry.97 The court concluded that Phil-
lips’ absence after receiving threats to herself, her son, and her family con-
stituted forfeiture by the defendant.98 
Toussaint illustrates how courts can find inferred intent in non-homicide 
cases of domestic violence. Important to note in Toussaint is the courts use 
of a separate hearing. This mechanism for determining forfeiture is benefi-
cial because it gives the court an opportunity to hear all relevant instances 
of past abuse before a jury is selected, creating a more efficient process for 
prosecutors to argue forfeiture. More importantly, courts are “permitted to 
disregard the rules of evidence when making preliminary determinations of 
facts to reach a decision on the admission of evidence.”99 Allowing a judge 
to hear all relevant instances of past abuse before ruling on forfeiture gives 
the prosecution an opportunity to truly flesh out the nature and severity of 
abuse. In doing this, the prosecution can highlight the effects of the abuse 
and its likelihood of dissuading the victim from cooperating with police and 
prosecutors. It also gives the defense an opportunity to argue against forfei-
ture outside the context of trial, where evidence of past abuse, if heard by 
the jury, would prejudice the jury against the defendant. Separate forfeiture 
hearings provide both sides an opportunity to argue separate from the jury, 
and with the entire focus being on forfeiture. 
CONCLUSION 
Acts of violence and credible threats keep abusers in a position of power 
over their victims. In his control lies the inferred intent Justices Scalia and 
Souter outline in Giles.100 Whether the culminating crime in an abusive re-
lationship is murder, aggravated battery, or any other crime against an inti-
mate partner, evidence of past abuse is a “road map” for judges to follow in 
determining intent. It can come in the form of threats, physical violence, 
economic abuse, or other similar acts of control, but they all end in the 
same place: the abuser’s inferred intent to prevent his victim from cooperat-
ing with law enforcement and prosecutors. 
                                               
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Toussaint, 55 V.I. at 426–27. 
99 Id. at 425; see also FED. R. EVID. 104 cmt. on 104(a). 
100 Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. 
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The complex nature of analyzing the totality of abuse presents challenges 
but is necessary to determine forfeiture. Difficulties should not act as a bar 
on seeking justice for the survivors of domestic violence, and courts should 
not shy away from the opportunity to hear arguments from prosecutors will-
ing to try. An abuser cannot be allowed to profit from his wrongful conduct 
and avoid the punishment that society deems appropriate. Prosecutors 
should be aware of and utilize the pre-trial setting to argue forfeiture when 
the victim is unavailable. As this comment suggests, in an abusive relation-
ship, there is likely to be ample evidence to illustrate the defendant’s intent 
to keep his victim from participating at a trial, which provides the requisite 
intent needed for a prosecutor to show that a defendant forfeited his right to 
confront the witness at trial. 
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